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From Wages and the Standard of Living to Consumer Culture 
Consumption and Global History in the Early Modern Period. 
Maxine Berg 
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Introduction: 
There is a large recent historiography on consumption and social and cultural 
history, yet there is much less on consumption and economic history.  Recent 
textbooks of British economic history have no chapters on consumption.  Instead 
there is a traditional place for chapters on wages and the standard of living.1  Though 
the most recent edition of the Cambridge Economic History of Britain does have a 
chapter on consumption, a closer look reveals that this too is mainly about wages 
and the standard of living. And yet consumption is a key factor in economic policy 
formation, for it is currently the source of much British tax revenue.– the proportion of 
business taxes on profits has shown a downward trend since the 1980s, while those 
on consumption have gone up; the corporation tax rate in 2008 was 28%, is now 
20%, and will be 18% by 2020, and VAT is now 20%, after rising from 17.5% in 
2011. During the eighteenth century, too, a key source of much government revenue 
was excise taxes and customs duties, that is, taxes on consumer goods. Political 
debate over these taxes fuelled radical reform movements, and contributed to the 
American Revolution.2 
Consumption, and especially luxury consumption was the key factor in 
debates on sources of economic improvement during the Enlightenment, and indeed 
this discourse stimulated the emergence of political economy as an intellectual 
subject area.  Today consumer economic theory and other social science theory 
raise many fascinating subjects, and have moved out in recent years to behavioural 
psychology.3And yet economic historians, apart from a few exceptions, have been 
reluctant to engage in analysis of its significance in economic change. 
Economists from Jevons to Marshall introduced analysis of consumption in 
terms of marginal utility.4 But mainstream economists showed little interest even at 
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the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century in the wider 
aspects of consumption.  It was those of heterodox views who took it up: Veblen, 
Ruskin and Hobson. Heterodox voices converged between the end of the 
nineteenth-century and the First World War to analyse, deconstruct and criticize a 
period of rapid growth of new wealth and luxury expenditure in Europe and America.  
Luxury goods, excess consumption and collecting were manifestations of Europe’s 
and America’s new superrich bourgeois classes. Banking and industrial families built 
palatial residences to be filled with all manner of globally-sourced luxury goods, and 
they collected antique objects, pictures and other art objects. There was a whole fin-
de-siècle debate on the decline of capitalism, moral corruption and social division. 
Sombart, Simmel and Veblen all published their critical texts on the hedonism of a 
fin-de-siècle age during this period. 5 Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees, first 
published early in the eighteenth century, reappeared at this time in a new American 
edition published by Kaye, and it was at the same time translated into German.   
      There was some interest in consumption among economists in the 1960s and 
1970s, but again for the most part the subject remained on the margins of 
mainstream economics.  While product development was advancing rapidly in this 
period, economists focussed on productivity change.  There was much discussion of 
consumer choice, but this was conceived as a choice between price and quantity; 
tastes, products and qualities were assumed by most economists to be fixed.  Two 
critical voices from within mainstream microeconomic theory, Kelvin Lancaster and 
Duncan Ironmonger, pointed out in the 1960s that consumers selected not just a 
consumer good, but among the many characteristics and qualities contained by such 
goods, but few took up the analysis of tastes that this implied.6 
     A few years later Tibor Scitovsky argued the case for the importance of novelty to 
consumer choice. Habituation in meeting demands needed to be punctuated by 
novelty and uncertainty; thus he highlighted novelty, variety, complexity and surprise 
which aroused the senses and stimulated pleasure.7 In recent years Marina Bianchi 
has used these ideas to develop her concept of the ‘active’ consumer, one who is 
not a passive price taker, but actively engages to form tastes, who responds to new 
goods and combines these in diverse ways to make an identity. This active 
consumer might well base her choices on sensual satisfaction over everyday 
convenience and even necessity.8 
     The use by these economists of ‘hedonic indices’ and the psychological theories 
underpinning these has also stimulated the economic historian, Avner Offer, to use 
these theories to explain twentieth-century consumer trends.  He argues that many 
economists assume that individuals can rank their different wants consistently, that 
they want as much as they can get, and that they act on their preferences. But this is 
not even frequently the case.  Wants become less compelling the more they are 
satisfied; and many people shift their preferences sequentially to more 
psychologically pressing ones. We live in states of anticipation and consummation, 
seeking the serial fulfilment of our transient desires.9 True prosperity in Offer’s view 
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is a good balance between short-term arousal, and long-term security; the challenge 
is not to maximize consumption, but to pace it back to a level of optimal 
satisfaction.10 
     These issues of the factors lying behind consumption, the choices, the stimulus 
and the complexities of satisfaction are central to explaining a history of consumption 
in the early modern world.  What difference has global history made to the histories 
we have written of consumption?  What part has consumption played in the factors 
considered in global economic history? 
2. The Great Divergence and Consumption 
First we can turn to consider the part accorded to consumption  in explanations of 
the Great Divergence.  Pomeranz compared consumption and luxury consumption 
across Europe, China, Japan and India to argue these were not significant factors 
behind differences between the great regions of the world.  He compared; he did not 
connect, and so he offered little analysis of the global connections in commodity 
trade as a factor behind the great divergence. 
Let us look first at his findings on different consumption patterns between East 
and West, and then to the differences accorded by other historians to global 
commodity trade. Pomeranz’s findings suggested that Chinese sugar consumption in 
1750 was higher than in continental Europe,  even as late as 1800; but at some point 
after this China’s per capita consumption of sugar declined, while Europe’s went on 
to grow very rapidly indeed after 1840.11 China’s tea consumption was also much 
higher than Europe’s at 11 oz. per person as compared to Europe’s 2 oz. per person 
in 1780s.12 He also compared the consumption in both regions of textiles and 
clothing to argue that Chinese textile consumption compared quite well against that 
of Europe in the mid to late eighteenth century.   
     There was, furthermore, evidence of a moral debate on excess consumption 
among the popular classes and peasants in the Lower Yangzi region of China and in 
eighteenth-century Japan. And there was a fashion system in clothing and some 
consumer durables in Ming China and Muromachi and Tokugawa Japan, though not 
in India or South-East Asia.13 Pomeranz attributed this to the role in these latter 
regions of personal dependency as the central organizing principle of society.14  
There was less change in the use of houses and the generations they contained 
than in Europe, and fewer changes in styles. But there was nevertheless a market 
for high-quality purchased goods even in villages in China’s backward macro-
regions.  There were likewise many Japanese consumer products in late Tokagawa 
and early Meiji era villages.15  
Pomeranz reinforced his support for the case for high standards of living in 
eighteenth-century China.  He found higher consumption there of tea and silk than in 
Europe as a whole, a widespread consumption of tobacco, and per capital cloth 
consumption on a par with Germany.  There was a very high expenditure on ritual, 
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and though meat and dairy consumption in China were lower, there were 
comparable levels of protein intake to Europe’s.16  
What did differ was the role of trade and imports in this consumption?  The 
Chinese consumed their own domestically-produced sugar, tobacco and tea. These  
products that became so crucial to Europe’s changing consumer habits, in China 
produced only a low profit-margin trade among small merchants, no significant 
revenues for the state, and thus no powerful lobbies to encourage their increased 
consumption.  Europe, by contrast, grew all its sugar, tobacco and coffee in its 
colonies, and bought tea from China with silver from the Americas.  And Europe 
drew its cotton from colonies or ex-colonies, while China grew much of its own.17  
The regional connections of commodities was thus missing from the divergence 
debate.  As Jan de Vries has pointed out recently, trade was toppled in this new 
historiography from the central role ascribed to it by Andre Gunder Frank.  Instead 
Pomeranz focussed on the Chinese trade that did not emerge in the Ming/Qing 
period.  There was no extensive specialization and inter-regional trade, and the 
Chinese trading diaspora in SE Asia did not give rise to a large trade in tropical 
goods to the Chinese metropole.   
     Both Pomeranz and Parthasarathi argued that China and India did not cultivate 
long-distance trade links because they had no need of them. The need for silver in 
both places did, however, generate a supply of goods for export sufficient to elicit 
from Europe an influx of silver capable of ‘oiling the wheels of the Chinese economy’ 
and acting as the ‘motor’ of the Indian subcontinent.’18  The point made by 
Pomeranz, and following him on South Asia, Parthasarathi, was that both parts of 
the world, East and West, had at least similar levels of consumption of goods such 
as sugar, tobacco, tea and textiles, but the part played by traded goods in this 
consumption was much higher in the West, and it grew much more rapidly there as 
trade escalated in the eighteenth century. 
 
What part then, did traded consumer goods play? Our recent global histories have 
focussed on commonly-shared experiences among different major regions of the 
world; they have not investigated the trade connections that linked these. The most 
recent work assessing the impact of these trade connections on the economy, Jan 
de Vries’s ‘The Limits of Globalization in the Early Modern World’19 set out the 
comparative levels of East India Company trade between Asia and Europe on the 
one hand and Atlantic trade on the other.  His data showed that Atlantic trade grew 
more than twice as fast as the Asia-Europe trade, and contributed twice the value to 
European GDP, and yet the indirect effect of the Asia-Europe trade was disruptive 
and highly significant in shifting consumer cultures.  
 
Standard explanations for the appeal of Asian commodities in early modern Europe 
are that they were exotic, unique or superior, and cheap.  But more important than 
this was the information flows they brought in their wake.  Merchants brought new 
knowledge about goods, and participated in developing innovative ways of 
incorporating these into European lifestyles with new uses and new products.20 
The East India companies were effective in gathering, processing and analysing 
large amounts of information about access to goods and ways of developing markets 
Commented [WU1]: Put in further section here on  trade. 
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for them.  In Europe most of these imported Eastern goods were sold at the outset in  
the company auctions, but distributing these goods out to wider European markets 
and the re-export trade beyond Europe was left to private trade.  The variety of these 
goods, and gradations of quality brought a new signifier to taste and product 
development in Europe. Such goods drew more households into the market.  In de 
Vries’s words, ‘information and industriousness were highly correlated.’21 
 
Pomeranz recognized the impact of new goods on shifting social behaviours.   He 
acknowledged Adam Smith’s fine analysis of the role of exotic baubles that appealed 
to the senses in motivating elites to acquire objects in lieu of retainers.  Exotic goods, 
Pomeranz wrote, also stimulated societies with strict sumptuary laws; because such 
goods were previously unknown and thus not yet assigned or forbidden to any 
specific group. Goods with remote origins were more easily mystified, and acquired 
greater ‘value’ than local or known goods with similar uses.22  Pomeranz accepted 
Jan de Vries’s case for an ‘industrious revolution’, that is that the demand for newly 
available goods helped to create new worker and consumer behaviours, but he did 
not provide any analysis for what difference this might have made for diverging paths 
of economic development.  
Part of the reason for this lies in the view of China’s historians that external trade 
was just less important for Chinese industry than it was for that of Western 
economies. As we have seen, sugar and cotton were internally produced.  
Europeans, facing supply constraints and high transactions costs in acquiring these 
goods externally, were stimulate to seek substitutes in other parts of the world that 
they controlled as colonies or through their own process and product innovation. 
Europeans learned to produce to Asian standards, varieties and qualities.  
They key external commodity which stimulated the economies of China and India 
was silver; but even this was not, in Pomeranz’s view, transformative.  Since the 
publication of The Great Divergence there has been much research on various 
aspects of consumption in many parts of the world, China amongst these.  Zheng 
Yangwen’s China on the Sea:  How the Maritime World Shaped Modern China 
(2012) investigates the taste for European goods in early modern China.  Goods 
from fragrances and clocks, to foodstuffs and architecture were ‘indigenized’  and 
contributed to commercial specialization.  There may be parallels in the 
transformation of the Chinese economy and society by foreign goods to the 
European experience, but they did not entail the connections that de Vries drew 
between the ‘industrious revolution’ and the industrial revolution.23   
Much of the more recent research on the history of consumption in other parts of 
Asia is focussed on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and addresses social 
and cultural history.24 But on India there research on the Mughal and princely courts 
reveals fashions and rapid changes in taste and styles led by the courts.  But this did 
not penetrate deeply into urban communities.25 Bayly depicted this consumer culture 
as a collecting culture, and a part of what he termed ‘archaic globalization’. Rulers 
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amassed goods from distant lands, and there was also a tributary flow of  
consumption; the nawabs & other rulers controlled flow of goods and services for the 
rest.  The courts also sought unique or highly specialist goods. Whereas modern 
complexity demands the uniformity of Levi’s and trainers, the archaic simplicity of 
everyday life demanded that great men prized difference in goods…In one sense 
archaic lords…were collectors, rather than consumers.’26  
This also affected the type of domestic goods produced for courtly consumption. 
Demand across the Mughal then princely courts centred on highly specialist cloth 
and decoration dependent on specific groups of skilled workers. For South India this 
entailed extreme specialisation by caste and sub- 
caste in the textile economy.  Producing the finest products for local rulers and 
European merchants left South India with the model of ‘luxury in a poor country.’ 
Dynasties of fine handicrafts were based in early learning and created unique forms 
of quality, deserving of their high reputation on world markets.  Specialist techniques 
were guarded by caste exclusivity. Sarees came in dozens of different kind; silk 
Kanchipuram sarees for weddings offered the choice of dozens of different border 
designs. Growing wealth and markets contributed to more specialisation and with it 
more status distinctions, and further refinements of skill; global markets tapped into 
this capacity to produce unique forms of ‘quality’. But there were limits on the impact 
of this high degree of specialization on wider consumer cultures and the economy 
itself.27 
Ritual display and bodily adornment were more important than consumer goods fixed 
in home furnishings. The Indian courts held  durbars or ceremonial gatherings where 
courtiers brought gifts and the Mughal emperor or the nawabs awarded other gifts: 
khil’ats (robes of honour), land titles & allowances.  The biggest consumer in the 
Nagpur region was the Maratha court. It bought three quarters of all fine muslins, 
shawls, and kinkhabs (silk brocades with gold and silver thread) for itself, retainers 
and soldiers.28 Textiles for dress reflected the wearer as much as the manufacturer: 
specific textiles reflected the moral and physical substance of the individual.  Many 
Muslims avoided wearing silk next to the skin, following the sayings of the Prophet 
against men wearing pure silk; instead ‘mashru’, a cotton-silk mix was developed.  
Yet Hindus valued silk above cotton, and would not wear the stitched cloth worn by 
Muslims.  The result was a highly- segmented consumer market.  Indian wealth was 
more fragile and fluid than in Northern Europe. The courts dominated consumer 
behaviour that was increasingly expressed in movable goods, and focused on the 
physical body. 29 
While imported goods, fashion and extensive product and quality differentiation were 
significant to consumption in India, this did not reach out to wider urban society, nor 
embed themselves in the everyday life of large groups of the population.  While they 
existed, they were not the stuff of the kind of ‘industrious revolution’ of Northern 
Europe. 
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3. Historiography – is there an economic history of consumption? 
To what extent do we have an economic history of consumption for the early 
modern world, or even parts of the early modern world apart from Europe? When we 
look to Europe, that historiography is focussed on Jan de Vries’s ‘industrious 
revolution’.  What debate we have in the historiography generated in the wake of the 
‘great divergence’ is not one over consumption, but over wages and standards of 
living.  Again, this is a debate over comparisons not connections. It does not tell us 
about consumer goods, or incentives to produce or to buy these; it does not tell us 
about the impact of some parts of the world on others, for example the impact of the 
Columbian exchange of foods, plants and diseases; of colonial groceries, of the 
impact of a global trade in resources and materials, nor of that in manufactured 
goods. 
What can we glean from that debate on wages and standards of living?  Carole 
Shammas asks ‘when and why did consumption of material goods become the 
measure of the ‘standard of living’? 30 Up to the years immediately following World 
War II the standard of living was conceived in purely material terms,that is the goods 
and services at one’s disposal.  Thus GDP per capita became the yardstick, but as 
we know, these indices did not show inequality or investment in human capital.  Now 
most indices of well-being skip over household budgets and real wages, and turn 
instead to life expectancy, health status and heights, as well as other indices of well-
being such as education.31 
Shammas summarized a widely-accepted position on European living standards 
to date: earlier estimates of early nineteenth-century income growth were revised 
downwards, and pre-industrial standards were revised upwards. New products were 
brought into Western Europe; diets were more varied, cotton fabric entered the 
clothing market, and textile prices dropped. Brick and stone replaced wood and clay 
in many centre cities, glass windows became widespread, and interior furnishings 
improved.  This was not due to lower grains prices, but to higher real incomes, lower 
costs of durables and semi-durables or better use of household labour.32 
Among economic historians of the early modern period, there has been intense 
debate over levels of wages and living standards, most of this centred on explaining 
industrialization and divergence.  Was there a great divergence in ‘wages and 
prices’? What does this add to an older debate on wages and the standard of living 
led by Hobsbawm in the 1960s?   The purpose of the debate in the 1960s and after, 
and in more recent configurations in studies of working class budgets led by Horrell 
and Humphries was to discover the impact of industrialization on the poor.  The 
purpose for the current wage-divergence debate is different.  That purpose for one 
leading contender, Robert Allen is to discover high wages in Britain compared with 
the rest of the world, and thence to argue that this wage premium could explain her Commented [WU3]: Set this out more fully and clearly. 
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prescient and rapid pace of technological change, and subsequent industrialization.33  
His book, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (2009), made this 
case in key chapters, ‘Why England succeeded’ and ‘Why was the Industrial 
Revolution British?’.34 He argued first that Europe’s ascent began in the century 
before the major impact of Atlantic and Asian commerce.  High wages in England 
and the Low Countries continued from the seventeenth century alongside population 
growth; their economies grew fast enough to sustain both.  Britain, especially, he 
argued was a ‘high wage, cheap energy economy’. This combination provided the 
key stimulus to the technological innovation underpinning the industrial revolution.  
High labour costs provided an incentive to substitute cheap fuel for labour.  Britain’s 
high wages induced technological change that substituted capital for labour.35   
Like Simon Kuznets’ projects of the 1950s to create large comparative data 
sets of income and productivity estimates, we now have many comparative data sets 
on wages and living standards, and aspirations to estimate these over large regions 
of the world in the early modern period. Allen’s comparators are based on silver 
exchange rates and on few cities.  Basing wages instead on grain and rice prices 
gives greater comparability in China and India to Europe. Indeed rice consumption 
and ownership of cattle contributed to living standards in different regions of India.36 
Turning to Japan, rising agricultural productivity in peasant farm households allowed 
wages to keep pace with economic growth.  New cash crops such as cotton and 
sericulture and rural commercialisation did not produce proletarianisation 37  Despite 
the findings of these critics, Allen sums up his comparisons using silver exchange 
rates to find real wages in Japan at similar levels to Britain, but those of India and 
China much lower, even one third those of England. He thus holds onto his position 
that high real wages were only to be found in NW Europe, and especially in the 
urban areas of England and the Low Countries.38 
 These debates over wages do not, however, take us much further into the 
history of consumption beyond that of basic foodstuffs.  Allen’s work remains a good 
example.  He refers to an Indian diet of rice, millets and pulses; in some areas fish 
provided the only source of animal protein. He writes of the poverty of ‘scanty 
clothing and barefoot’, of mud huts with thatched roofs, of few furnishings beyond 
bamboo mats, of cooking done in earthen pots. His sources are Raychaudhuri and 
Habib from 1982.39 He finds similar minimalism in China, based on an account of 
Charles Lockyer, an early eighteenth-century merchant traveller. It seems obvious to 
him that northwest Europe with its white bread, meat, dairy products and beer had 
the highest standard of living. But is this so clear?  The new histories of food and its 
preparation need to be linked to the wage baskets used by economic historians. 
Allen’s brief discussion of the consumer revolution refers to statistical evidence of 
increased consumption of luxuries and novelties: tropical foodstuffs such as tea, 
sugar, coffee, and chocolate and imported Asian manufactures – cotton, silk, 
porcelain and British and European imitations, but he does not investigate their 
consumption; their existence is just further evidence of the high wage economy of 
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England and the Low Countries.40 Economic historians now need to look more 
deeply into the consumption of specific types of goods – those associated with 
inequality and those that shifted behaviours. 
4. Inequality 
Recent research on inequality focuses on the macroeconomic picture of the 
distribution of income and wealth. Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-first 
Century (2015) compares rising inequality in the period from the 1970s with the 
growth in inequality in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Piketty 
compares the wealthy elites inheriting patrimonial wealth with the growth of elites 
from the eighteenth century whose wealth was increasingly based on interest earned 
on private holdings of government debt. Rentiers living off increasingly lucrative 
investment earnings contrasted with the labouring poor whose relative wages did not 
rise in any degree until after the mid nineteenth century. Furthermore, property 
incomes rose from the mid eighteenth century in Europe, and increased inequality. 
Technical change during the late eighteenth and in most of the nineteenth centuries 
in Western Europe and in the USA reinforced this inequality, as capital was 
substituted capital for labour in many manufacturing processes. Factories employed 
less skilled labour; processes were simplified and products standardized for mass 
production in factories.   
What impact did these trends to rising inequality as well as changes in technology 
mean for consumption?  Once again the research we have is about wages and 
assumptions over what goods comprised the wage basked.  Comparisons of wages 
and standards of living have focussed on the working classes consuming ordinary 
commodities, and budget studies are mainly based on foodstuffs. But as we know 
the rich and the poor consume different things.  Philip Hoffman has argued that the 
price series economic historians have relied on overuse staple products especially 
food, standardized older products, internationally traded goods, physical goods, and 
they underuse luxury goods, labour-intensive goods,  new products, non-traded 
products, retail products and services.41  
Luxury goods in the eighteenth century became cheaper relative to staple 
foods, but their impact is as hard to quantify as that for introducing new goods and 
services into today’s cost of living indices. Fashion and luxury goods changed 
constantly, frustrating the search for consistent time series. Hoffman looked at price 
changes over a whole series of standardized commodities, and found the biggest 
advances of prices in fuel, rent, and cinnamon, and the greatest reductions of prices 
in textiles, sugar, silver, paper, beer, and unskilled labour.  He found rising food 
prices and falling wages of unskilled labour.  Many of those luxury products falling in 
price made use of factors that were getting cheaper across the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries: clothing and textiles, paper, chocolate, pewter, and sealing wax 
became cheaper along with the labour that went into them.42 Adjusting the cost of 
10 
 
living index with clothing, light, fuel, and beverages shows standards of living 
declined a little less in the period than previously estimated.  But we also need to 
look further to class –specific cost of living indices. 
 Lower prices of luxury and staple goods brought real income gains for the 
wealthier and for richer regions. Hoffman also charted the temporal cycles in this 
inequality.  Between 1500 and 1650 the top income groups experienced a 20 per 
cent reduction in their cost of living.  But between 1650 and 1750 there was a  
reversal with the common people gaining.  This swing reversed again in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, with wealthier groups gaining from the impact on 
prices of luxury goods of greater trade and new technologies.  It was not until the last 
half of the nineteenth century, that inequality moved again in favour of the lower 
classes.43 In the period 1500-1650 the wealthier benefitted most from cheaper new 
luxury goods as well as old luxuries such as domestic servants, and higher land 
rents added to their wealth.  The poor faced scarcer food, and higher costs of 
housing and land. In England a second inegalitarian trend  took place between1740 
and 1795/1815.  
Hoffman poses that these trends favouring the wealthier classes in early 
modern northwest Europe might help to explain the great divergence.  The gains to 
the early phases of industrialization might well have contributed to changing 
behaviours associated with the ‘industrious revolution.’ 
5. The Problems with Budgets, Probates, Orphans and Thieves 
     Accounting for inequality addresses some of the problems we have with 
diametrically opposed, but equally widely-accepted positions on standards of living 
even within only Europe.  But much speculation, new sources and different data sets 
remain at odds.  Horrell and Humphries investigated 1,350 household accounts and 
budgets of the labouring poor in Britain over the period 1790-1850 to draw a 
pessimist case on trends in family incomes over the later eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.44 Their results, though resting on data from the end of the 
eighteenth century, also led them to give little credence to ideas of an ‘industrious 
revolution’ or a ‘consumer revolution’ reaching below the levels of the middling 
classes.45 Horrell’s recent summing up reinforces earlier positions.  ‘Studies of the 
standard of living in the classic Industrial Revolution have failed to find evidence of 
increases in material welfare reflected in the consumption patterns of the mass of the 
population between 1790 and 1850.’46 She argued that most studies based on 
probate inventories might support a hypothesis of rising consumption, but only for 
the middling classes; they anyway showed only a very gradual spread in the 
ownership of innovative goods across England.47  
Wider European probate inventories, however, indicated greater ownership of 
new goods, both imported and British and European; these inventories were 
gathered from many parts of Britain and Northern Europe. They were gathered from 
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those of the middling classes, but also included many from the labouring classes.48 
These demonstrate possession of new and imitative consumer goods, and evidence 
of new eating practices, with the use of ceramics, glass and cutlery replacing pewter 
and wooden platters. Jan de Vries put the social history of new consumer practices 
in Europe together with probate accounts gathered for England and some other parts 
of Europe especially for the Netherlands to underpin his concept of the ‘industrious 
revolution.’ This has been the one serious analysis of an economics of consumption 
for the early modern period that was not about prices and wages, but about changing 
tastes and household behaviour. De Vries drew on Gary Becker’s analysis of 
household allocation of time to argue for a shift in household labour priorities from 
home produced goods and services to market production.  More within the 
household in early modern Europe sold their labour, and bought some of those 
goods they had formerly made themselves.  They also worked longer and harder in 
order to satisfy a new taste and demand for goods imported into the locality or 
region, imitations of these or entirely new goods.  De Vries called this more intensive 
labour across the household an ‘industrious revolution.’  Decisions about 
consumption could be seen, therefore, as intra-household decisions on time use and 
expenditure, with wider effects on labour supply and intensity. Though wages were 
falling in the second half of the eighteenth century, probate inventories and other 
evidence of material possessions indicated that ownership of material objects was 
increasing. De Vries thus provided an explanation for this paradox, and one that 
engaged directly with an economic history of consumption. His case has been 
challenged by those who argue that labour intensification was driven by necessity 
rather than consumer aspiration.49 
His position was further endorsed by research on other records. Orphans’ 
accounts from the Netherlands and textile identifying markers from the London 
Foundling Hospital indicated wide use of tea and tea and coffee wares and textile 
ownership in Amsterdam, other Dutch cities and London. Records of the London 
orphans and foundlings indicated widespread ownership of printed cottons and 
mixed cotton and linen fabrics. Anne McCants in her analysis of the Dutch orphans 
parental inventories found wide evidence of Chinese and Japanese ceramics 
reaching right through the middling classes and even down to artisans of very 
modest income levels.  In further research she has found a wide range of types of 
textiles owned by these groups, including some expensive Indian printed calicoes. 
She argued there had to be a widespread consumer demand for these commodities 
so that they were incorporated into budgets and daily routines in sufficient amounts 
to alter overall standards of living.50 Coffee was consumed by low wage workers by 
late 1720s, and by the mid eighteenth century coffee and tea were no longer luxury 
commodities. The taxing authorities believed tea and coffee consumption to be 
universal by the mid eighteenth century.51 Styles used unusual records such as the 
mid to later eighteenth century Foundling Hospital records of thousands of swatches 
of mothers’ clothing that were attached to records of the infants they left in the 
orphanage.  The large numbers of printed cotton and especially fustian (or 
Commented [WU4]: This material on devries should come 
earlier in the paper. 
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cotton/linen mix)  fabrics worn by predominantly poor urban women demonstrated 
not so much the huge penetration of Indian textiles, but the rapidly advancing 
imitations of these made in small Lancashire mills.52  
Toll records in Hamburg also indicate the rapid uptake of colonial goods, and 
especially coffee in Germany and Northern Europe. Hamburg’s imports of colonial 
goods made up 46.9 percent of overseas imports in 1733-42, but rose to 70 per cent 
from 1769.  Coffee imports between 1736 and the 1790s increased more than ten 
fold in real terms. Average annual coffee consumption rose to 2.6kg, and in the 
course of the eighteenth century, ‘coffee had made significant inroads into the 
everyday consumption patterns of the German population.’53 
It was not only orphans who revealed the hidden material lives of the poor, but 
thieves.  Beverly Lemire and John Styles drew on the records of stolen goods in the 
Old Bailey to show the wide use inn London of cotton textiles, of fashionable items 
and accessories.54 More recently Jane Humphries, Sara Horrell and Ken Sneath also 
used these records to construct a database showing a much greater impact of 
fashion aspiration and the desire for variety and differentiation amongst common 
people than the earlier research on working class budgets of Horrell and Humphries 
had conceded.  Some of these goods had come from Asia, and many more were 
European imitations of these. These recent findings point to fashion and tastes 
influencing the ownership of items, though with some space for price and income. 
They see evidence of changing fashions in rising, then falling thefts of silver buckles, 
aprons and sleeves, and found significant theft of tea-drinking equipment after 
1750.55 They found cotton stockings popular items of theft from the poor, and the 
theft of napkins and table linen from those lower down the social scale as incomes 
rose.56 
 
 
6. Where is the Economic History of Consumption? 
 
We appear to have reached a stalemate on the economic history of consumption 
in the early modern period. Most of the research has been on Northwest Europe.  It 
is still focussed on wages and standards of living, with a great divide between those 
making the case for higher wages and/or more food and material possessions, and 
those arguing stasis or immiseration. Wage baskets are estimated on mainly on 
basic foodstuffs.  Can an approach through large data sets take us in new 
directions?  What analysis and questions lie behind the data sets?  What was 
consumed, who consumed it, how and why did they consume it? 
 
I suggest we move down to a micro scale in order to connect an economics of 
consumption with the significant research on the social and cultural history of 
consumption.  We can then engage with issues over choice and new products, 
encountering and integrating strange goods, desire and stimulus seeking in the 
Scitovsky model, but also social interaction and awareness.  We can investigate why 
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and when taste mattered, the choice of qualities over quantities, and the role of 
fashion.  
 
Foodstuffs are one example. Grains, as we have seen, need to be converted to 
flour for consumption. Different, and even mistaken estimates of the quantitative 
impact of flour milling technologies can have large-scale and misleading effects on 
our assessments of food consumption.57  Food, furthermore, needs to be prepared 
and cooked.  Even within early industrial Britain there were great differences in 
cooking practices related to the availability of coal.  The labouring poor in Yorkshire 
cooked their meals and heated their homes. Those in the South of England, though 
there were fewer women working in arable areas, faced much greater fuel 
constraints; they cooked much less and bought their bread.58 Different food baskets 
also connected to different work regimes.  Coffee consumption spread quickly in the 
proto-industrial regions of Germany.  Textile workers consumed less grain and 
protein-rich foods than agricultural labourers. Coffee could be prepared quickly, it 
increased concentration on long hours of repetitive tasks, and it suppressed hunger.  
Merchants organizing the textile trade also dealt in coffee, and often paid their 
outworkers in coffee.59 
 
Tastes and fashions for exotic goods are another case. Economic historians 
Horrell and Humphries have very recently conceded the part played by fashion and 
tastes on the ownership of goods.  Their data sets indicated that consumers 
substituted towards more expensive cotton stockings and counterpanes and away 
from worsted and linen.  This was not about emulation, but about respectability, 
politeness, and differentiation.  They sought greater variety and higher quality. 60  
Jan de Vries argued that the information spread by trade with the East was also one 
of product differentiation; information had a demonstration effect on European 
consumers. 61  He summed up the several historical explanations for the attraction to 
Europeans of Asian goods:  they were exotic, they were superior, and they were 
cheap.  But in most cases they were not indispensable; some could be cultivated 
elsewhere, and import substitutes provided a similar and more dependable 
experience.  The goods themselves, therefore, were less important than knowledge 
about the goods.  They were the type of goods that changed tastes, and created new 
markets and products. Asian imports, especially the textiles and the porcelain 
stimulated a commercialization of societies in retailing, and drew households into the 
market.62 
Lynn Hunt’s Writing History in the Global Era (2014) links a cultural history of 
society and the self in later seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe to how 
exotic goods were experienced and chosen.  Internal European factors interacted 
with wider global connections.  Europeans developed a culture in which exotic goods 
made sense.  Larger numbers, especially in specific places with higher discretionary 
incomes wanted more choice.    A desiring, stimulus seeking self developed in 
tandem with social awareness – different varieties and individual choices amongst 
these demarcated new social groups.  Tastes changed as experiences of the self 
changed.63   
We can thus understand the varieties of goods carried in East India Company 
cargoes and constantly sought in East India Company orders.  This was no random 
collection of goods, but one constantly responding to large-scale buyers at the 
Autumn and Spring company auctions, these were closely affected in turn by the 
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choices of all the small retailers and peddlers they sold on to.  French colourways 
dictated Swedish silk imports from China; Company orders went out with letters 
criticizing the colours of earlier cargoes, and demanding dynamic, responsive and 
intuitive designs and patterns.  Dutch and English East India Companies and private 
European and Indian merchants competed vigorously for the finest figured 
jamdammie muslins.  The fashion demand that underlay the issues of agency and 
identity behind the sense of self also developed in a social framework.  Cities were a 
part of this story. The close urban integration of towns and cities in the Low 
Countries and Britain provided a context for the sociability that fostered new 
experiences of consuming Asian goods.  That sociability demanded goods that 
signalled gentility, politeness and respectability, and increasingly from the mid 
eighteenth century, sensibility. 
7.  The Case of Textiles 
A global history of the consumption of cotton textiles provides an opportunity to 
address for some of these issues.  As in the case of consumer durables in the early 
modern period most of the research has focussed on Europe, but there is now more 
on the Americas, Africa, South Asia and East Asia. In all of these regions fashion, 
sumptuary codes, tribute and gifts dominated incentives to consume a commodity 
that was newly-traded between some large areas of the globe, then newly-
manufactured in Europe and the Americas. Cotton is also the subject of two recent 
large-scale global histories:  Giorgio Riello’s Cotton:  the Fabric that Made the 
Modern World (2013), combined extensive research on museum collections of 
printed cotton textiles with archival research to argue for the existence of a wide 
globalized economy based in the wider world trade in printed cotton textiles from 
India throughout the early modern period.  This trade stimulated industrialization in 
Europe, and especially Britain as Europeans sought to build an industry to match the 
fine material attributes of these cottons at low consumer prices.64 Sven Beckert’s 
Empire of Cotton: a Global History (2014) provided another history of raw cotton and 
cotton manufacture, but mainly in Europe and America in the modern period.65  
What are the key markers of this consumption across the early modern world?  
The entry of cotton into European ways of dress was slower than we once thought.  
Merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries needed to ‘educate’ their 
potential market, and cotton only became truly popular from the mid eighteenth 
century. Colour fastness, novelty and new distribution channels were all important to 
their uptake.  The Dutch consumed the new fabrics right down the social ladder by 
the early eighteenth century; at least a quarter of households in the Amsterdam 
inventories had them.  By later in the eighteenth century there were many 
substitutes, and cottons were widely used in the dress of wage earners in Paris and 
in Castille.66 
Well before Europe’s encounter with Indian cottons Gujarati traders tapped 
into a lively demand in East Africa.  The Portuguese traded cotton from Gujarat, 
Sindh and Cambay for slaves that were then sold on at a very high profit in Brazil, 
Mexico and the Caribbean.  By the late seventeenth century the Gold Coast 
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imported 20,000 metres of European and Asian cloth a year, and between 1690 and 
1800 cloth made up 68 per cent of all commodities exported from England to Africa; 
40 per cent of this was from India.67  Sumptuary codes on colour and high demand 
for geometric patterns and stripes in vibrant colours shaped the trade. From an early 
period Indian cottons were a highly desirable luxury good in many parts of Africa.68 
 Gujarati cottons exported to East-Central and South-east Africa responded to 
highly-specific and changeable tastes. They were used as a currency, were 
important in social, cultural and political life in both coastal and interior areas.  Cloth 
bestowed moral and social qualities; it marked high and low status, was a significant 
diplomatic gift, and marked political and cultural ceremony. Taste and fashion 
dictated these markets.69  
The Latin American market was divided into higher quality imported goods 
and cheaper local products.  Indian cottons came to Mexico via the Pacific Manila-
Acapulco route or via European imports, and were preferred in bright colours and 
floral patterns.  Cottons entered rapidly into the wardrobes of the colonists of French 
and British North America and the Caribbean; consumers sought a ‘more refined and 
expensive product’.  By the last decade of the eighteenth century one quarter of 
London’s cotton imports went on to Africa; and high proportions were also re-
exported to the Americas.  In Riello’s words, ‘ cotton became a global commodity.’70 
Historians are now exploring the motivations of cotton’s consumption in these 
different regions of the world.  A commodity that connected India to Europe, East 
Asia, Africa and the Americas also conveyed very different meanings to its 
consumers.  Plebeian families distinguished between ‘best’ and working clothes; 
they owned changes of clothing and duplicates, and dressed up for church and 
popular festivities They focussed their consumer expectations on clothes; they were 
a sign of self-respect.  They chose and they benefited from new kinds of fashionable 
clothing made from cotton.71 
In the North American and Caribbean colonies cotton was worn in the 
seventeenth century by male officials, merchants and professionals, but by the early 
eighteenth century was the fabric of choice of free urban dwellers, and used 
increasingly by women.72 In Spanish America cotton was first worn by slaves and 
Indians; it was associated with non-Spanish, non-European ways, but this too shifted 
quickly in the early eighteenth century when fine Indian calicoes and European 
imitations reached Spanish America in large quantities through Dutch and English 
traders and smugglers.  Strict sumptuary codes connected with racial categories 
perceived by the Spanish rulers.  But soon Spanish cottons were promoted, and 
cottons conveyed different identities of Indians, slaves and creoles.73 
Early modern India’s consumption of cotton textiles reveals some of the 
factors we have seen discussed by Bayly in his idea of a shift in consumption 
regimes from archaic to modern globalization, where consumption was about the 
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tributary flow of goods, and the priorities of rulers and elites centred on collecting.74  
But there were also highly diverse markets for many medium-quality as well as fine-
quality materials.  These cottons changed over time; they appealed to different social 
status and aesthetic preference.  Their markets also revealed fashionability, and 
finishing in dyeing, printing, and embroidery appealed to consumers across India and 
outside.75 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
     An economic history of consumption has eluded many economic historians.  
Many have continued instead to create larger data sets and to compare like with 
unlike on levels of wages and standards of living.  In the space left by Pomeranz in 
the Great Divergence debate they have debated whether wages were different 
between regions of the world, and whether this factor drove other economic 
stimulants such as technological change.  But all those factors explored by social 
and cultural historians behind changing consumer behaviour from status and social 
structure to gifts, diplomacy and display, and on to fashion, sensibility and identity 
have remained beyond the purvue of most economic historians. The window opened 
to such investigation by Jan de Vries’s concept of ‘industriousness’ has still provided 
little illumination into key consumer practices. Global economic history in fact turned 
attention away from such investigation. The dearth of economic analysis into these 
many motivations behind consumer behaviour underpins an economic history which 
continues to avoid the history of consumption in favour of the history of wages. 
A global economic history must include global connections as well as global 
comparisons.  The impact of exotic goods and of encounters between merchants 
from different parts of the world helped to transform the contents of the probate 
inventories, toll registers, thefts, foundling hospital identifiers, and indeed food 
baskets.  Individual, micro and local studies are now revealing these in research 
such as that recounted here on cotton textiles.  Different products and distinctive 
qualities, different preparations and presentations affected food baskets as much as 
domestic interiors and dress.76  There is much for global economic historians to 
discover at the micro level that will move us beyond the now very dated questions 
and materials still informing the big data sets of wages and prices. 
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